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INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY DETERMINATIONS IN THE STATES:
THE VITALITY OF THE BEN AVON RULE
"The long debate about de novo review versus restricted review is
about ended; the celebrated Ben Avon case is of little interest except as
history . .. " ' While Professor Davis' statement probably describes
the present status of federal administrative law, 2 several recent decisions
militate against accepting it as an accurate portrayal of the state picture,
at least as concerns utility rate regulation. 3 The Ben Avon case 4 is still
1. Davis, Scope of Review of Federal Administrative Action, 50 CoL. L. Rav. 559

(1950).

2. See Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940)
(de novo review of state commission's oil pro-ration order denied even though contesting party claimed confiscation); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591,
602 (1944) ("If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and
unreasonable, judicial inquiry . . . is at an end.") ; New York v. United States, 331
U.S. 284, 336 (1947) (after district court took evidence in rate case which they
heard de novo on claim of confiscation, the Court said "...

if the . . . evidence

was necessary to pass on the issue of confiscation, the case should have been remanded
to the Commission . . ."); see generally, Davis, supra note 1.

But cf. Atlantic

Coastline RR. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 77 F. Supp. 675 (E.D.S.C. 1948) (in action
to enjoin enforcement of Public Utility Commission order on ground that it was
confiscatory, party contesting order was entitled to trial de novo) ; Pichotta v. City
of Skagway, 78 F. Supp. 999 (D.C. Alaska 1948) (in action to enjoin city from
enforcing allegedly confiscatory rate order, party contesting the order had right to
a trial de novo); Pittsburgh S.S. Co. v. Brown, 171 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948)
(action by employer to enjoin compensation order under Longshoremen's Compensation Act given trial de novo on appeal). The Pittsburgh case was decided on authority of Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), a case related in many of its
aspects to the Ben Avon case. See Schwartz, Does the Ghost of Crowell v. Benson
Still Walk?, 98 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 163 (1949).
3. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comni'n v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 253 Ala. 1, 12, 42
So.2d 655, 662 (1949)

(".

.

. a duty rests on the court to examine the order of the

Alabama Public Service Commission on the issue of confiscation . . . and in this
connection to exercise its independent judgment on both the facts and the law involved.") (citing the Ben Avon case) ; Port Smith v. Southwestern Bell. Tel.
Co., 220 Ark. 70, 78, 247 S.W2d 474, 479 (1952)

(".

.

. we do examine, .

.

. to

see that the order of the Commission does not amount to a confiscation of the property
of the Utility . . .") (citing the Ben Avon case) ; Florida Power Corp. v. Smith,
CCH 1950 UTIL. LAw RI. 9 16,157.01 (Fla., 1951) (". . . where the issue is
whether the rates prescribed by public authority are confiscatory, the court is not
bound to accept the findings of the rate-making authority though they are supported
by substantial evidence, but may exercise its independent judgment upon the facts.")
(citing the Ben Avon case); Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Atlantic Gas Light
Co., 205 Ga. 863, 876, 55 S.E.2d 618, 627 (1949) (". . . where a public service
commission prescribes rates under which the utility company affected claim that its
property will be confiscated, the State must provide a fair opportunity for submitting
the issue to a judicial tribunal for a determination upon its own independent judgment . . .") (citing the Bet Avon case) ; Lowell Gas Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Util., 324
Mass. 80, 88, 84 N.E.2d 811, 816, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 825 (1949) ("It must, therefore, be taken to be the law of this commonwealth. . . that the Declaration of Rights
guarantees to an owner, who alleges that confiscation of his property will result
from a rate order of the department, a fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a
court for determination upon its own independent judgment as to both law and
facts. . . .") (citing the Ben Avon case) ; Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Maltbie,
296 N.Y. 374, 381, 73 N.E.2d 705, 707 (1947) ("The Ben Avon case has never been
overruled; on the contrary the principle that where constitutional rights of liberty
or of property are involved due process requires independent judicial determination
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being cited and recognized as controlling by a sufficient number of states
to merit an investigation of the apparent inconsistencies and contradictions
in the area of judicial review of rate orders of state public utility agencies.
THE CASE

The Ben Avon case involved a rate order of the Pennsylvania Public
Service Commission which fixed the maximum rates to be charged by the
Ohio Valley Water Company. The company alleged error in the commission's findings and appealed to the Superior Court on the ground that
adherence to the order would result in a confiscation of its property. The
Superior Court reversed , the commission's order on the ground that the
commission had erred in its findings relating to the value of the company's
plant and therefore had not properly computed a fair return on property.
This holding was in turn reversed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 6
which held that as there was substantial evidence to support the commission's findings, such findings were binding on the court. On further
appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed 7 the Pennsylvania
result, holding that where the owner of the property affected claims that
confiscation of his property will result from an administrative agency's
order, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that the state provide for an independent judicial review of both the
law and the facts involved in the order, and that a review limited to an
inquiry as to whether there was substantial evidence to support the commission's findings was insufficient to protect the constitutional rights of
the complaining party.
Despite the storm of criticism which followed the Ben Avon decision,8
the case was later reaffirmed, although somewhat modified, by the Supreme
Court in Saint Joseph Stockyard Packing Co. v. United States.9 The
Court again held that in cases involving claims of confiscation resulting
from administrative agency determinations, an independent judicial review
of the order was to be afforded the claimant, but added that the findings
of the agency after hearings on the subject should be accorded considerof the constitutional question in the courts has been reaffirmed."); Valley & Siletz
R.R. v. Flagg, 195 Ore. 683, 714, 244 P.2d 639, 654 (1952) ("...
in cases which
are based upon averments of confiscation the courts try the issues de novo . . .");
State v. Dep't of Pub. Serv., 19 Wash. 2d 200, 218, 142 P.2d 498, 508 (1943)
(".

. . if the owner claims confiscation of his property will result, the State must

provide a fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its independent judgment as to both law and facts

.

.

.")

(citing

the Ben Avon case).
4. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
5. Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co., 68 Pa. Super. 561 (1917).
6. Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co., 260 Pa. 289, 103 Atl. 744
(1918).
7. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
8. See authorities collected in Comment, 39 MIcH. L. REv. 438, 439 n.3 (1941);
DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW, 919 n.222 (1951) ; Wiel, Administrative Finality, 38
HARV. L. Rav. 447, 464 nA7 (1925).

9. 298 U.S. 38 (1936), 35 MIcH. L. REv. 159, 15 TEx. L. REv. 128.
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able weight. This dicta provided one method, adopted later by many
10
states, of avoiding the full effect of the Ben Avon rule.
The legal literature that has grown up around the Ben Avon case is
voluminous." The case has been analyzed many times as to both its legal
and logical correctness and further analysis from this approach would be
repetitious. The extended discussions, however, have failed to consider
many relevant problems still existent in the states. Do many states still
regard the Ben Avon case as controlling? If this is answered affirmatively
why do some states follow it and not others (since the doctrine is purportedly based on a federal constitutional requirement)? To what extent
do those states that purport to follow the Ben Avon rule actually do so
in terms of a truly "independent" review? To what type of state administrative action is the rule applied? What are the arguments for and
against the doctrine?
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW ON THE PROBLEM

The Supreme Court has never expressly overruled the Ben Avon case
although certainly it has retreated from its original position to a considerable degree. 2 This gives rise to one 'of the more perplexing problems
surrounding the Ben Avon case: the question of why the case has more
vitality in the state courts than in the federal courts. 18 This is particularly
noteworthy when it is remembered that the Ben Avon scope of review
was required to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. 14 While there have been some recent decisions in lower federal
courts apparently reaffirming the Ben Avon rule, 15 the generally accepted
view is that it is no longer important in the federal courts. This might
be due to a tendency in the federal courts today to emphasize procedural
due process within administrative agencies themselves. The Johnson Act
of 1934 16 is undoubtedly a contributing factor. It provides that federal
district courts shall not enjoin or otherwise interfere with rate orders
of state administrative agencies where the requirements of procedural due
process (e.g., reasonable notice and fair hearing) have been provided,
and where an effective remedy (there is no mention of de novo review)
is available in the state courts. Before the passage of this Act the federal
courts were used to obtain an independent review of alleged confiscation.
Since the passage of the Act the burden of so protecting the persons
10. See text beginning at note 64 infra.
11. See note 8 supra; see also, Notes, 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 417 (1953); 57 YALE
L.J. 639 (1948).

12. Cases cited note 2 supra; Davis, note 1 supra.
13. Cases cited note 3 supra.
14. However, it should be noted that in some states the independent review requirement has been based on other than federal constitutional grounds. See text
beginning at note 56 infra.
15. Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 77 F. Supp. 175 (E.D.S.C.
1948) ; Pickotta v. City of Skagway, 78 F. Supp. 999 (D. Alaska 1948).
16. 48 STAT. 775 (1934), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. 1952).
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affected by the agency orders has shifted mainly to the state courts.17
This Act combined with the Supreme Court's apparent retreat from the
Ben Avon doctrine might be the reason for the de-emphasis of the
Ben Avon doctrine in the federal courts. Also, since the passage of
the Administrative Procedure Act,' 8 there seems to be an awareness in
federal courts of a congressional desire to limit the role of the judiciary
in its relations with administrative agencies. This thought might well have
carried over into the relations of the federal courts with state agencies.
On the other hand, the state courts are closer to the utilities and other
persons affected by the orders and are more likely to be influenced by any
pressures that can be brought to bear. There may also be a cognizance
on the part of the state courts that the state agencies are less expert than
their federal counterparts (admittedly they handle fewer cases and are
usually lower paid) and, therefore, there is need for an additional check in
the form of a wider scope of review over the agency's decisions, i.e., a Ben
Avon type of review. However, the situation when viewed from a purely
doctrinal viewpoint remains anomalous.

THE

STATES AND

BEN AVON: POSSIBLE BASES

FOR ADHxERENCE TO OR
REJECTION OF THE DOCTRINE

There is no doubt that many states at least purport to follow the
Ben Avon doctrine.' 9 The obvious explanation is that the case has never
been expressly overruled. However, it is equally clear that many states
no longer follow the doctrine, 20 nor do most of the federal courts. 21 Such
17. See United Gas Corp. v. City of Monroe, 46 F. Supp. 45, 46 (W.D. Ia.
1942). ("We may take notice of the fact that the purpose of this [act] . . . was
to stop a widespread practice by non-resident corporations of taking cases involving
local rates into Federal courts, and to compel a resort to the State courts except
where the rate making authority had, in effect, denied due process of law, by failing
or refusing to accord 'reasonable notice and hearing.'").
18. 60 STAT. 237-44, 5 U.S.C. §§1001-1011 (1946).
19. See note 3 supra.
20. Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Glenwood Springs, 98 Colo. 340, 55 P.2d
1339 (1936) (findings of commission on disputed questions of fact are final under
statutory provision dealing with review of rate orders); Denver Producing & Refining Co. v. State, 199 Okla. 171, 184 P.2d 961 (1947) (". . . it would be presumptuous of our courts, on the basis of conflicting testimony, to deem the view of the
administrative tribunal, acting under legislative authority, offensive to the Fourteenth
Amendment. . . ." Id. at 174, 184 P.2d at 964 [quoting Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan
& Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 581]) ; Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 260 Wis. 212, 219, 50 N.W.2d 416, 419 (1951) (". . . we must accept
findings of fact of the commission, even where a constitutional question is involved,
if the commission's findings are supported by substantial evidence." This statement
was made in a case involving a claim that the order contested would result in a
confiscation of property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.)
See Joy v.
Winstead, 70 Idaho 232, 242, 215 P.2d 291, 296 (1950) (court can protect constitutional rights without independent review where there is claim of confiscation);
Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 332 Mich. 7, 50 N.W.2d
826 (1952) (court will look only to see if total effect of rate order attacked as confiscatory is unreasonable).
21. Cases cited note 2 supra.
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jurisdictions as Alabama, 22 Washington,2 New York 24 and Texas 25 are
26
found at least claiming to follow the doctrine while Colorado, Oklahoma 27
and Wisconsin 28 have apparently rejected it. While no recent cases directly on point have been found, it is probable that Michigan 29 and
Idaho 30 have also disclaimed the doctrine. Pennsylvania, the state in
which the case arose, still adheres to it,31 although with some modifications
as to the "independence" of the review.8 2 There should be some logical
reason why some states have adhered to the Ben Avon rule while others
have rejected it. If a rationale can be discovered it can both point up the
substantive reasons behind a particular state's decisions on the problem,
and aid in predicting future results. Inquiry reveals, however, that it is
difficult, if not impossible, to categorize according to any logical basis the
type of cases or the jurisdictions that do and do not follow the rule. The
only generalization that can safely be made is that most of the cases
in which the rule has been applied have been rate cases 3 3 although the
doctrine has been invoked in a few other instances such as licensing, 4 and
orders to restore corporate assets.3 5 Other possible considerations are
discussed below, but prove to be of little aid in a search for a rationale.
The Expertise Factor.-One argument frequently raised against adherence to the Ben Avon rule is that the scope of review should depend
to a large extent upon "the comparative qualification of a court and agency
to decide the particular question." 3 6 Therefore, since the agencies are more
skilled than the courts to deal with most of the problems involved in making
a rate order, the agency should as far as possible control the result and
the scope of review of the court should be limited. Related to this argument is the theory that those states with the more expert agencies would
22. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 253 Ala. 1, 42 So.2d 655
(1949).
23. State v. Dep't of Pub. Serv., 19 Wash. 2d 200, 142 P.2d 498 (1943).
24. Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Maltbie, 296 N.Y. 374, 73 N.E.2d 705 (1947).
25. Cf. Lone Star Gas Co. v. State, 137 Tex. 279, 153 S.W.2d 681 (1941).
But cf. Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex. 323, 198 S.W.2d 424 (1946).
26. Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Glenwood Springs, 98 Colo. 340, 55 P.2d
1339 (1936).
27. Denver Producing & Refining Co. v. State, 199 Okla. 171, 184 P.2d 961
(1947).
28. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 260 Wis. 212, 50 N.W.2d
416 (1951).
29. Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 332 Mich. 7, 50 N.W.2d 826
(1952).
30. See Joy v. Winstead, 70 Idaho 232, 215 P.2d 291 (1950).
31. See Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 153 Pa. Super. 475,
34 A.2d 375 (1943) ; Solar Electric Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 137 Pa. Super. 325,
9 A.2d 447 (1939).
32. See text after note 64 infra.
33. See note 3 supra.
34. See, e.g., Laisne v. State Board of Optometry, 19 Cal. 2d 831, 123 P.2d 457
(1942).
35. First Industrial Loan Co. v. Daugherty, 148 P.2d 439 (Cal. App. 1944).
36. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 927 (1951).
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be the ones less likely to follow the Ben Avon rule with its greater control
of the agency by the court. Expertness of an agency is, of course, difficult
to ascertain but it would seem that the agencies with the highest pay and
the most business (therefore with the most experience) should be among
the most expert. The commissions in New York and Massachusetts are
two of the highest paid in the country.3 7 These two states are also two
of the largest in regard to the number of utilities regulated, and the amount
of utility business done. 88 However, both of these states follow the Ben
Avon rule,3 9 while Oklahoma 40 and Colorado,41 two of the smaller states
with less busy and lower paid commissions have rejected it. Therefore,
the factor of administrative expertise seems to have little relation to a
court's decision to accept or reject the Ben Avon doctrine.
Administrative Procedure Legislation as a Factor.-Another factor
that has been recognized in determining the weight to be given to administrative agency determinations and consequently the type and scope of
review to be given to orders is the procedural safeguards afforded parties
in the agency hearings. "Even though procedural safeguards cannot
validate an unconstitutional delegation, they do furnish protection against
an arbitrary use of properly delegated authority." 42 It would seem that
states with more "advanced" administrative procedure legislation, those
with assurance of procedural due process within the agencies, might be
less apt to follow the doctrine with its additional judicial control over the
agencies than would states with less adequate procedural safeguards. Because of the wide variations among the states in administrative procedure legislation it is of little help to classify the states on this basis.
Some states have adopted general administrative procedure codes, 43 others
deal with only some aspects of administrative law, 44 and other states have
enacted special procedures for each individual agency. 48 Thus an attempt
at classification on this basis would be either so generalized as to be valueless or so specific as to be unwieldly. 46 As an example of the futility of
trying to predict whether or not a jurisdiction will follow Ben Avon on
37. BooK

OF THE STATES 441 (1952-1953).
38. STATisTicAL ABSTRAcT OF THE UNITED STATES 481, 487 (1952).
39. Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Maltbie, 296 N.Y. 374, 73 N.E.2d 705 (1947);
Lowell Gas Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Util., 324 Mass. 80, 84 N.E.2d 811 '(1949), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 825 (1949).
40. Denver Producing & Refining Co. v. State, 199 Okla. 171, 184 P.2d 961
(1947).
41. Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Glenwood Springs, 98 Colo. 340, 55 P.2d
1339 (1936).
42. United States v. Royal Rock Cooperative, 307 U.S. 533, 576 (1939).
43. E.g., N.D. REV. CODE § 22 (1943).
44. E.g., Wis. STAT. § 227.01 (1951).
45. E.g., N.Y. PuB. SERV. LAW § 112.

46. See generally HEADY,

ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURE

LEGISLATION

IN

THE

(1942); Harris, Administrative Practice and Procedure and Comparative
State Legislation, 6 OKLA. L. REv. 29 (1953); Nathanson, Recent Statutory Developments in State Administrative Law, 33 IOWA L. REV. 252 (1948).
STATES
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the basis of its statute, the differences in phrasing, flavor and content of
the Public Utility Codes of Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Massachusetts
on the subject of judicial review of commission orders may be cited. The
Massachusetts statute gives the reviewing court power to ".

. review,

.- ;47
modify, amend or annul a ruling or order of the commission..
the Pennsylvania statute only authorizes the court to "dismiss the appeal,
or vacate the order . . . in whole or in part." 48 The Wisconsin statute
permits the court to "affirm the decision of the agency, or . . . reverse or
modify. . . ." 49 The Pennsylvania statute states as the grounds for

reversal of a commission order "error of law or lack of evidence to support the finding .

.

. of the commission, or violation of constitutional

rights." 50 The Wisconsin statute gives as grounds for reversal the fact
that the agency order is "contrary to constitutional rights," or "in excess
of statutory authority . . . or affected by other error of law," or "made

upon unlawful procedure," or "unsupported by substantial evidence," or
that it is "arbitrary or capricious." 51 But the Massachusetts statute
merely states "unlawfulness" as the ground for overruling a commission
52
order.
Comparison of the above statutory clauses would seem to indicate a
similarity of legislative intent in Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. Massachusetts, on the other hand, would seem to have a scope of review substantially different from either Wisconsin or Pennsylvania. The fact is,
however, that despite their similar statutory provisions, Pennsylvania purports to follow the Ben Avon case while Wisconsin does not.5" Furthermore, Massachusetts definitely adheres to a Ben Avon scope of review 54
although its statute is unlike Pennsylvania's. Thus the statutory articulation of scope of review has little bearing on the instant problem.
Moreover, a reading of the cases on point discloses none in which
the inadequacy of the hearing before the commission was the primary
reason for reversal of a commission order. In fact an unfair hearing
has never appeared as the main ground of an appellant's case. Thus it
appears that the unfairness of the administrative procedure within the
agencies is not a reason why courts have exercised a wide scope of review.
It should also be noted that the federal courts would not be precluded
by the Johnson Act from hearing any cases based on such a complaint. 55
47. MAss. ANN. LAws c. 25, § 5 (1952).
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1437 (Purdon 1941).
49. Wis. STAT. §227.20 (1951).
50. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1437 (1941).
51. Wis. STAT. § 227.20 (1951).
52. MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 25, § 5 (1952).

53. Compare Solar Electric Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 137 Pa. Super. 325, 354,
9 A.2d 447, 464 (1939), with Chicago, M. St. P. & P. Ry. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
260 Wis. 212, 50 N.W.2d 416 (1951).
54. Opinion of the Justices, 328 Mass. 679, 106 N.E.2d 259 (1952) ; Lowell Gas
Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Util., 324 Mass. 80, 84 N.E.2d 811 (1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 825 (1949).
55. See text at note 16 supra.

1953]

REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY

This, plus the fact that there is substantial similarity in the statutes in
requiring a hearing and notice, lends little to the belief that the level of
administrative due process among the states bears a significant relation to
the states' position on the Ben Avon rule.
State Constitutions as a Factor.-Certainstate courts have given as
a reason for following the Ben Avon rule the theory that even if the
Federal Constitution does not require an independent judgment by the
courts on claims of confiscation, their state constitutions do so require.56
Therefore, another basis for reconciling the positions of the various states
on this problem is suggested. Examination should be made of the similarities, if any, in the constitutions of the states on one side of the fence
and their differences, if any, from the constitutions of the states that have
taken a different stand on the problem.
In an Opinion of the Justices,5 7 the Massachusetts court rested its
decision substantially on state constitutional grounds, contending that the
First, Tenth and Eleventh Articles of the Massachusetts Constitution required an independent review of agency action. The First Article contains
the statement, found in almost all state constitutions, that all men have the
right to enjoy life, liberty and maintain property. The Eleventh Article
states that all ought to have remedies for wrongs done them and is also
found in almost all state constitutions. The Article which can be construed
most easily to support the result reached is the Tenth, which states that no
man shall have his property taken from him except by a representative
body. However, it would seem that an administrative body, as an arm of
the legislature, is at least as representative as the courts.
California 58 based its adherence to Ben Avon on state constitutional
grounds which differed from those of Massachusetts. The California court
argued that failure to follow the Ben Avon rule would result in a deprivation of property without due process of law. A due process provision is
again found in all state constitutions. Another ground suggested in the
decision was the provision in the California Constitution relating to the
separation of powers and prohibiting any body, except certain enumerated
courts, from exercising state-wide judicial powers. 59 By labelling the
agency action as "judicial" the court brought such action under the constitutional prohibition and required a de novo trial of the issues already
decided by the agency. The court apparently failed to consider that its
judicial power would not be usurped if the Ben Avon doctrine were not
followed. There still is a power of review ("sustantial evidence"), which
while not so wide as a Ben Avon review, is nevertheless effective. By
56. Lowell Gas Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Util., 324 Mass. 80, 84 N.E.2d 811, cert.
dentied, 338 U.S. 825 (1949) ; Laisne v. State Board of Optometry, 19 Cal. 2d 831,
123 P.2d 457 (1942).

57. 328 Mass. 679, 106 N.E.2d 259 (1952).
58. Laisne v. State Board of Optometry, 19 Cal. 2d 831, 123 P.2d 457 (1942).
59. CAInF. CoNsT. Art. III, § 1; VI, § 1.

116

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102

exercising such a review the courts would at the same time preserve their
judicial function and guard against any violations of due process. The
reasoning of the California court also seems to ignore the difference between the "judicial" power (that which is vested in the courts) and a
"quasi-judicial" power (that which is frequently exercised by administrative agencies).6o Separation of powers provisions are found in almost all
state constitutions; furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized, in a case arising before Ben Avon, that "[e]ven where it is
essential to maintain strictly the distinction between the judicial and other
branches of government, it must still be recognized that the ascertainment
of facts, or the reaching of conclusions upon evidence taken in the course
of a hearing of parties interested, may be entirely proper in the exercise
. .6
of executive or legislative, as distinguished from judicial powers..
While it may be commendable for the states to require more protection of property under their constitutions than is required under the Federal Constitution, the Ben Avon case itself, while incorporated in the courts'
opinions is unnecessary to the result. Because of the general similarities
in state constitutions it appears that arguments for and against following
the Ben Avon rule based on state constitutional grounds are used to bolster
previously arrived at conclusions; no real basis for classification on such

grounds exists.

62

The Failure of the Search for a Basis of Classification.-Since they
apparently were not considered by the courts in deciding whether or not to
follow the rule, factors such as the degree of expertness of a commission,
60. The concept of a "quasi-judicial" power and its rationale is by no means a
new one.
". .. there is a distinction, which the courts have observed, between judicial
investigation and decisions concerning the relative rights of individuals and the
rights of individuals and the public.
"Power to hear and determine matters . . . affecting public and private rights
is conferred upon, and exercised by, administrative officers.
". .. if all quasi judicial power and discretion were taken from administrative
• . . officers, and every question of this kind . . . had to be submitted to law

trial, the courts would be incumbered with useless litigation, and the administration
of the government would become so expensive that it would be intolerable." Bellingham Bay Imp. Co. v. New Whatcom, 20 Wash. 53, 58, 54 Pac. 774, 775 (1898);
see also Murray v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co., 18 How. 272 (U.S. 1855). For
extended discussions of "Quasi-Judicial" see McGovney, Administrative Decisions
and Court Review Thereof, 29 CALrF. L. REv. 110 (1941); Wade, "Quasi Judicial"
and its Background, 10 CAMB. L.J. 216 (1949).
61. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298, 301 (1913).
62. Another reason why certain states follow the rule and others do not might
be that those states that had confiscation cases arising during the period closely
following the decision in the Ben Avon case felt compelled to follow it and thereby
established precedent to which they owe fealty, while states which did not have cases
arising on point until the Ben Avon case fell from favor have no such "compelling"
precedents to follow. In Massachusetts there were affirmations of the Ben Avon
rule by the highest court of the state in 1925. Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569,
147 N.E. 681 (1925). This was also true in Pennsylvania. Bangor Water Co. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 82 Pa. Super. 48 (1923) ; Borough of Lewistown v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 80 Pa. Super. 528 (1923). However, this was evidently not the case in
New York. Compare, People ex rel. Consolidated Water Co. v. Maltbie, 275 N.Y.
357, 9 N.E.2d 961, aff'd, 303 U.S. 158 (1937), with Staten Island Edison Corp. v.
Maltbie, 296 N.Y. 374, 73 N.E.2d 705 (1947), 96 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 266.

1953]

REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY

or the administrative procedure safeguards of the jurisdiction have not
proved helpful in explaining or predicting the judicial attitude toward
the Ben Avon rule in a particular jurisdiction. However, the possibility
of using these factors as an argument in a particular case still exists.
The Ben Avon case is "there"; it has never been overruled; it should
certainly be cited to a court if the problem it deals with is under consideration; but there is little rational basis given in the existing opinions for
adoption or rejection of the rule.68
LImITATIONS ON THE "INDEPENDENCE"

OF REVIEW

Although many state courts still profess to follow the Ben Avon case
a more discerning analysis of the cases and statutes involved lends credibility to the belief that the Ben Avon rule has few adherents today. Reference has been made previously to the Supreme Court's approval, in the
Saint Joseph Stockyard case, 64 of giving great weight to the agency's findings. This practice has been adopted by most states either by establishing
a presumption that the findings of the agency involved are prima facie
correct, 65 or by stating that the one contesting the order has to come
forward with "clear and convincing" proof of confiscation. 66 Both of these
procedures place a burden of proof on the contesting party which is not in
accord with the theory of a de novo hearing, although they may be reconciled
67
with the theory of "independent" review.
Another device that is used to avoid the full effect of the Ben Avon
rule is the restriction of the evidence which can be brought before the court
on appeal to that contained in the record of the agency hearing.6 8 There
is little doubt as to the constitutionality of such a restriction.6 9 The device
has been modified in some states so that new evidence can be offered to the
court, but the court must send the case back to the agency for reconsideration in the light of the new evidence, and only if the original order is reaffirmed can the new evidence be brought before the court in a new appeal.70
63. Professor Dickinson's statement that ". . . there are no iron-clad rules applicable to the cases in general, to forecast with certainty how far a court will
review in a given case" would still seem to be valid. DICKINSON, ADmINiSTRATIVE
JUSTICE AND THE SUPREmAcY OF LAW 71 (1927).
See also Schwartz, Does the
Ghost of Crowell v. Benson Still Walk?, 98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 163 (1949).
64. 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
65. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 25, § 5 (1952); Florida Power Corp. v. Smith,
CCH 1950 UTIL. LAW REP. 1116,157.01 (Fla. 1951); Incorporators of Service Gas
Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 126 Pa. Super. 381, 190 At. 653 (1937).
66. See Lone Star Gas Co. v. State, 137 Tex. 279, 153 S.W.2d 681 (1941).
67. A "de novo" trial connotes a completely new proceeding with everything
done afresh; an independent review, however, can admit of certain restrictions as
to the material upon Which the independent judgment is to be exercised. This
distinction has been recognized by some courts, although the problem resolves itself
to a question of labels. For a discussion of the differences between a trial de novo
and an independent review see Trayner, J., concurring and dissenting in Dare v.
Board of Medical Examiners, 21 Cal.2d 790, 803, 136 P.2d 304, 311 (1943).
68. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1437 (Purdon 1941); MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 25,
§ 5 (1952), as amended by MAss. GEN. LAWS c. 575 (effective Sept. 1, 1953).
69. See Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 348 (1951).
70. See, e.g., N.D. REv. CODE § 28-3219 (1943) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 25, § 5, as
amended by MAss. GEN. LAWS c. 575 (effective Sept. 1, 1953).
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The problem of restriction of the evidence heard on appeal is an important
one. After the recent reaffirmation of the Ben Avon rule in Massachusetts, 7 '
and after the advisory opinion by Massachusetts' highest court that a proposed law denying independent review would be unconstitutional, 72 the
Massachusetts Public Utility Commission considered the problem so pressing that it proposed emergency legislation restricting evidence that can be
heard by the reviewing court to that of the commission record. This
proposal was adopted by the state legislature and has recently gone into
effect. 73 Litigation on the problem of restricting evidence is now pending
in Michigan 74 and Indiana 7 5 and the counsel for the Public Utility Commissions in both states have expressed the opinion that if evidence in addition to that contained in the commission record were allowed to be introduced before the court, the commissions' operations would be greatly
hindered. (Note that neither state follows the Ben Avon rule.) 76 Their
fear is that if the evidence on review is not restricted, the attorneys for
the opposing parties will withhold evidence until the case is brought into
court so as to gain the element of surprise.
In response to a questionnaire sent to a number of attorneys for
utilities and for other companies which have dealings with commissions,7 7
one attorney stated that he would probably attempt such strategy. However, even though in many states discovery procedures similar to those
in the federal code are not in force, it seems that under present day discovery procedure the surprise element would be vitiated.78 It would also
seem probable that in most cases attorneys would feel that their clients
would be better served by getting all the evidence before the commission
so as to get the most favorable order and avoid the additional expense
consequent to an appeal.7 9 Once the courts are restricted so that only evidence that was brought before the commission can be heard, and there
71. Lowell Gas Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Util., 324 Mass. 80, 84 N.E.2d 811 (1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 825 (1949).
72. Opinion of the Justices, 328 Mass. 679, 106 N.E.2d 269 (1952).
73. MASS. GEN. LAws c. 575 (effective Sept. 1, 1953).
74. Letter from Robert A. Deregonski, Counsel for the Michigan Public Service
Commission, on file in the Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law
School, 3400 Chestnut St., Phila., Pa.
75. Letter from James T. Robison, Public Counselor for the State of Indiana, on
file in the Biddle Law Library, .mpra note 74.
76. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Indianapolis Ry., 225 Ind. 30, 39, 72 N.E.2d 434,
438 (1947); Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 112 N.E.2d 751 (Ind.
1953); City of Detroit v. Michigan R.R. Comm'n, 209 Mich. 395, 177 N.W. 306

(1920).
77. All such responses are on file in the Biddle Law Library, supra note 74.

78. Procedures such as pre-trial conferences, the increased taking of depositions
and interrogatories and other discovery devices would all tend to eliminate'the surprise element. While not in force in all jurisdictions, the growing tendency is to
adopt them. See CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 89 (1947).
79. One attorney noted that although there might be a difference in presentation
of the case on appeal, there probably would be no difference in presentation before
the commission because most commissions set rates according to certain formulae.
Most attorneys, therefore, concentrate on trying to fit their facts to the particular
formula adopted in that jurisdiction.
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is a presumption that the agency order is correct, the degree of independence
with which the court can operate is diminished considerably.80 However,
even under the above mentioned restrictions on the independence of the
review there is no need for the person contesting the order to prove that it
is arbitrary and unreasonable as he must do in states that do not follow
the Ben Avon rule,8 ' and the courts are not bound to accept an order as
valid even though there is substantial evidence to support it.8 2 By the
devices of restriction of evidence and presumption of agency correctness
state courts can guard against a reversal on the basis of a reaffirmation of the
Ben Avon rule by the Supreme Court and at the same time guard against
such dangers, allegedly inherent in following the Ben Avon doctrine, as
frequent and time consuming appeals to the courts, the substitution of the
judgment of the courts for the expert knowledge of the agencies, the withholding of evidence by attorneys until appeal is taken, and an invasion by
the courts of the province of the legislature.
THE PROPERTY WHICH THE DOCTRINE PROTECTS

Another puzzling fact in this field is the apparent restriction of the
application of the doctrine, in those states that purport to follow the rule,
to the field of utility rate regulation.8 It is true that some states that follow the Ben Avon rule have a wide scope of review, or even a de novo
review in non-rate order cases involving large companies.8 4 However, most
recent cases in which the Ben Avon case has been cited approvingly are
rate cases. There may be an explanation as to why the rule has not been
applied to the typical small business. The small businessman or private
citizen adversely affected by an agency order is probably less willing to bear
the expense of appeal to the courts than is the large utility. But this does
not explain why the rule has not been applied in many cases, other than
80. Since the degree of "independence" of the review given is under discussion,
the question arises as to just how far the courts do go into the evidence before
them on appeal. Do the courts state that they are giving an independent review
as an incantation against reversal on further appeal or is there truly an independent
review and judgment exercised by the courts when there is a claim of confiscation
with some merit to it? Judging from the length of the opinions and the amount
of analysis presented it would appear that the courts examine the problems very
thoroughly, and even where there appears to be substantial evidence to support the
commission's order a truly independent review of the facts and the law is evident.
See, e.g., Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Maltbie, 296 N.Y. 374, 73 N.E.2d 705
(1947); Lowell Gas Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Util., 324 Mass. 80, 84 N.E.2d 811 (1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 825 (1949); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Bell
Tel. Co., 253 Ala. 1, 42 So.2d 655 (1949).
81. Compare State v. Dep't of Pub. Serv., 19 Wash.2d 200, 142 P.2d 498 (1943)
with Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 332 Mich. 7, 50
N.W.2d 826 (1952).
82. Compare Lowell Gas Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Util., 324 Mass. 80, 84 N.E.2d
811 (1949) with Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 260 Wis.
212, 50 N.W.2d 416 (1951).
83. See cases cited note 3 supra.
84. E.g., Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Long, 243 Iowa 514, 51 N.W.2d 135 (1952).
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85
This
rate cases, which involve utilities or large non-utility corporations.
discrepancy, where it does exist, may be due to the fact that courts which
might be hesitant to disregard the Ben Avon case in a factual situation
similar to the original case would be less inclined to do so in a distinguishable situation. This in fact appears to be what has happened to another
86
famous "scope of review" case, Crowell v. Benson, which is now limited
in its application to cases factually like 8the original, although again there
is no logical basis for such a restriction.
Even those states which allow a wide scope of review in non-rate
utility cases are less inclined to grant such a review to the more numerous
and commonplace agency determinations such as license revocations and
employers' contributions to unemployment insurance, even though there
88
One having a license revoked
might be a claim of confiscation involved.
or an employer contesting his rate of contribution to unemployment insurance would seem to have as much reason to claim confiscation of his
property as a utility whose complaint is that the agency order would not
89
The policies considered
allow them to make a "fair" return on property.
by the courts in limiting review in these cases would seem to be the same
as those in rate cases, e.g., the fear of numerous cases flooding the courts
after an agency has been set up to deal with them; but different conse91
At
quences have ensued,90 sometimes as a result of applicable statutes.
least one state does give an independent review in license revocation cases
on the basis of the Ben Avon rule 9 2 but such a practice is unusual even
93
Positing that
among jurisdictions that follow Ben Avon in rate cases.
the number of cases appealed to the courts concerning individuals would
far outnumber the rate cases that might arise (although there is doubt that
the people affected by these orders would be as likely to appeal to the
courts considering the expense) it would seem that these cases would be
less time consuming than rate cases, particularly in light of the amount of

85. Compare Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Nunnis, 252 Ala. 30, 39 So.2d 409
(1949) with Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 253 Ala. 1, 42
So.2d 655 (1949), and compare Shupee v. Railroad Comm'n of Texas, 123 Tex. 521,
73 S.W.2d 505 (1939) with Lone Star Gas Co. v. State, 137 Tex. 279, 153 S.W.2d
681 (1941).
86. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
87. See Schwartz, Does the Ghost of Crowell v. Benson Still Walk? 98 U.
OF PA. L. Rev. 163 (1949).
88. E.g., Compare Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 253
Ala. 1, 42 So.2d 655 (1949) with Broadway v. Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding
Co., 246 Ala. 201, 20 So.2d 41 (1944).
89. In license revocation cases one must constantly be aware of the "privilegeproperty" dichotomy which confronts claims of confiscation. See GELLHORN, ADmINISTRATIVE

LAW,

CASES AND

COMMENTS

274 (1947).

90. Compare cases cited note 88 supra with Lowell Gas Co. v. Dep't of Pub.
Util., 324 Mass. 80, 84 N.E.2d 811, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 825 (1949) and Opinion
of the Justices, 328 Mass. 629, 106 N.E.2d 269 (1952).
91. See MAss. AN. LAWS c. 152, § 11 (1949).
92. Laisne v. State Board of Optometry, 19 Cal. 2d 831, 123 P.2d 457 (1942).
93. See e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 112, §§ 64, 84 (1949). See also, Reynolds v.
Valentine, 169 Misc. 631, 7 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1938) ; Leach v. Coleman, 188 S.W.2d 220
(Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
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evidence and testimony involved. It is also probable that the courts are
more accustomed to handling the types of problems which arise in license
revocation cases, for instance, than in cases involving the reasonableness
or confiscatory nature of utility rates. 94
Another reason that might be advanced to explain the limitation of
the doctrine to rate cases is that unemployment insurance and many of the
types of licensing legislation were later developments in administrative law
than rate regulation. 95 The agencies that handled the latter areas developed
at a time when the courts were more accustomed to administrative agencies
and more receptive to the theories behind them; therefore, there was less
desire to exercise restraint over the agencies to the extent of making an
independent review of their orders than there was at the time when the
precedents were being established in rate cases. The Ben Avon case
was itself a manifestation of a line of thought the Supreme Court had expressed in earlier cases. 0 There were no such precedents to demand the
courts' adherence in deciding the scope of review in unemployment insurance cases and others of that type. This, combined with the growing
familiarity of the courts with the policies behind administrative agencies
and the development of new theories of administrative law, might be the
basis for the distinction as to the type of case to which the Ben Avon rule
is applied.
THE PRACTITIONER'S PROBLEMS

The previous discussion has dealt with the possible reasons why certain states may have adopted the Ben Avon rule in its original or modified
form and has attempted to rationalize the differences among the various
states, or, more accurately, illustrates that little logical reason exists to
substantiate such differences. Some attention must also be given to the
practical arguments against following the Ben Avon case. The discussion
in this section is largely based upon correspondence, referred to previously,
with counsel for utilities and utility commissions.
An argument that is frequently advanced against acceptance of the
Ben Avon rule is that once the doctrine is adopted persons affected by an
adverse commission order will immediately appeal to the courts and, thus,
"[h]earings before the Commission may be transformed into preliminary
proceedings . . . and the courts . . . may emerge as the progenitor
94. "We should have a review of that question, for we should be as competent
as the Board to deal with it... " L. Hand, J., in NLRB v. Standard Oil Co., 138

F2d 885, 887 (2d Cir. 1943).

95. Unemployment insurance in the form in which it is now known (a compulsory plan enforced by the state with contributions by the state, and the employer) was a product of the depression and arose in the years 1929 to 1936.
106 A.L.R. 1531. Licensing, in the widespread form it is known today, is a relatively new development. CoUNcIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, OCCUPATION"AL LIcENsING LEGISLATION IN THE STATES 21-4 (1952). Rate making was an earlier development. ALLmGE, RATE-MAKING FOR CoMMON CARRIERS 10 (1929).
96. Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.S. 307 (1886); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry.
v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
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of rate-making policies." 97 The conclusion that the Ben Avon rule encourages appeals seems to be borne out by the effects of the reaffirmation
of the rule in Massachusetts.98 In the thirty years prior to the decision of
the Lowell Gas Company case there were no appeals from rate orders in
Massachusetts. Since that case there have been three such appeals in a
relatively short period of time. 99 Of course it does not necessarily follow
that the Ben Avon rule was responsible for the post-Lowell Gas case
appeals, but the inference to that effect is strong and the Commissioner of
Public Utilities of Massachusetts believes the rule to be primarily responsible. It is significant that of the Public Utility Commissions answering,
all but one preferred not to work under the Ben Avon rule. Furthermore,
over half of the attorneys questioned admitted that they would be more
likely to appeal from adverse commission orders in a state that followed
the Ben Avon case than in jurisdictions which did not.
There is a limitation on the propensity to appeal, however, even in a
"pure" Ben Avon state. The costs of litigation during the time taken for
agency hearings and retrial of the issues on appeal would seem to act as
a deterrent against all but cases with very good chances for success. This
factor is naturally of less importance in utility cases than in the few cases
arising under the rule which concern persons or businesses with less
resources. Assuming that existence of the rule in some form is desired,
modification of the rule would seem to be the best answer to the numerous
appeals argument. Even though the commission counsels prefer elimination of the rule, they do indicate that a limitation of the evidence that could
be heard on appeal to that of the commission record 100 and a presumption
that the commission order was correct 1 0 1 would substantially vitiate the
effect of the rule. These modifications would of course minimize chances
of reversal of agency orders and would limit the number of appeals. Positing that the company contesting the order is willing to appeal despite the
probability that the commission order will be sustained, just what allegations in the complaint will suffice as a claim of confiscation so as to bring
the Ben Avon rule into play? There appears to be little in the case or
statute law dealing specifically with this problem. Only the usual procedural rules, such as those dealing with summary judgment and the
striking of pleadings because they are sham and frivolous are commonly
available to strike down groundless claims of confiscation. A complaint
sufficient to call for application of the Ben Avon rule has been stated to
require the allegation that "the commission's orders result in confiscation
97. Note, 57 YALE L.J. 639, 645 (1948).
98. Lowell Gas Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Util., 324 Mass. 80, 84 N.E.2d 811, cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 825 (1949) ; Opinion of the Justices, 328 Mass. 679, 106 N.E.2d
269 (1952).
99. From Statement of Commissioner Edward N. Gadsby, representing the Department of Public Utilities, before Joint Legislative Committee on Judiciary relative to House Bill 102 (1951).
100. See text at note 68 supra.
101. See text beginning at Note 64 supra.
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of [complainant's] property in violation of its constitutional right to receive
a fair return . . . upon its property . . . specifically alleging the cost
of its property . . . the cost of its reproduction, its reasonable value, the
maximum rate of return which the rates proscribed will provide . . . and
that such rates will not afford a reasonable return on such cost and value.
These allegations . . . must be taken at face value. .
.o2
,,
These
allegations are specific enough so that the court will be able to discern
whether the claim is a groundless one. Claims in licensing cases need not
be so specific for they are not so complex and their decision probably does
not require any great degree of expertise. Massachusetts has developed
a device which would cut down still further on the number of meritless
claims of confiscation. This is the imposition of the penalty of double costs
on the party contesting the order where there is a finding that the claim
was interposed only for the purpose of delaying the effectuation of the
10 3
order.
The Difference in Presentation of the Case if the Ben Avon Rule
is in Effect.-The question was asked of both the counsel for the commissions and the private attorneys who practice before them, whether there
would be any differences in the presentation of their case on appeal depending on the existence of the Ben Avon rule in the jurisdiction concerned.
Half of the attorneys questioned replied that there would be no difference.
The others said that there would be more emphasis placed on the facts,
and in effect a complete rehearing of the evidence would follow in the hope
that they could get the appellate court to accept their version of the facts. 10 4
The counsel for the commissions uniformly felt that there would be marked
differences resulting in lengthier trials because of the greater emphasis in
re-proving the facts before the appellate court. There would also be a
necessary difference in the procedural remedy to be pursued, 0 5 and a
difference in the burden of proof if the court adopted the "pure" Ben Avon
rule in which there would be no presumption of correctness attached to the
commission order. 0 6 Such differences would indicate the practical difficulty
with the Ben Avon rule of unduly involving the agencies in extensive court
102. Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Maltbie, 296 N.Y. 374, 380, 73 N.E.2d 705,
706 (1947), citing Prendergast v. New York Tel. Co., 262 U.S. 93 (1922).
103. MASs. ANN. LAws c. 25, § 5 (1952).
104. One attorney even went so far as to suggest that if he were in a Be;
Avon state, he would withhold evidence from the commission in order to present a
more convincing case for reversal on appeal. (This letter is withheld from the
Biddle Library files by request of its author.)
105. There are different procedural devices that have to be used depending
upon the scope of review afforded the particular agency decision and the statutes
relating to judicial procedure in the jurisdiction. For a discussion of the operation
of these different remedies in certain states, see Davis, ADMINisTRATmv- LAW 718
et seq. (1951); Brown, The Use of Extraordinary Legal and Equitable Remedies
to Review Executive and Administrative Action in Massachusetts, 21 B.U.L. REv.
632 (1941), 22 B.U.L. REv. 55 (1942); Riesenfeld, Bauman, and Maxwell, Judicial
Control of Administrative Action by Means of the Extraordinary Remedies in
Minnesota, 33 MINN. L. REv. 569, 685 (1949), 36 MINN. L. REv. 135 (1952).
106. See note 64 supra.
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litigation. This, plus the fact that their own determinations are given little
effect, would seem to impair seriously the functions assigned by the legislatures to the agencies.
CONCLUSION
The Ben Avon case is of more than "historical interest." Unfortunately, there is no substantive basis upon which to determine whether or
not any particular state will adhere to the case. Little in the way of uniformity is evidenced among the states in the reasons advanced for following
the case. Perhaps the rationale of Judge Arthur Vanderbilt is the proper
one. He has stated that "The state courts of last resort generally are
zealous in exercising their duties as modern successors of the Court of
King's Bench in superintending . . . agencies particularly where constitutional problems are involved." 1o
There is a difficult balance to be struck, to reconcile fear of administrative over-reaching if the scope of review is too limited, and fear that too
thorough a judicial review would destroy the very reason for establishing
administrative agencies. But the same dilemma exists initially in every
branch of administrative law. If the courts have resolved their relations
with the agencies in other areas, no reason exists why rate cases should
stand as an exception. Furthermore, a reaffirmation or express overruling
of Ben Avon by the United States Supreme Court does not seem to be the
answer to the problem as some would suggest. It has been shown that
a few states have developed the de novo review approach independently,
although the initial impetus probably came from the Ben Avon decision.
If there is in fact a need for a "wide" scope of review in cases (and
this should not be limited to utility rate cases) where the agency order is
allegedly confiscatory, provisions such as those limiting the evidence that
can be brought before the court, introducing the presumption that the
commission order is correct, and imposing a penalty for bringing groundless claims of confiscation, would seem to alleviate the most feared effects
of the Ben Avon case and at the same time strike a balance between the
judiciary and the "fourth branch of government."
107. ANNUAL SURVEY oF AMERICAN LAW 205 (1944).

